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through the instrumentality of mind. In either case, the role 
of the mind is indispensable. 
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OVERVIEW 
In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, one of the principal 
Upaniṣads, we find a venerable and famous story where 
the god Prajāpati separately instructs three groups of 
people (gods, humans, and demons) simply by uttering 
the syllable “Da.” What is remarkable about this passage 
is the way this single syllable is interpreted in different 
ways, dattā, dāmyatā and dayadhvam, by the three groups, 
with each interpretation considered correct by the speaker, 
Prajāpati. This story, which was largely known only to Indian 
readers of the Upaniṣads, became a feature of the European 
imagination of India in 1922 when it was referenced in the 
section “What the Thunder said” in T. S. Eliot’s The Waste 
Land.1 
In this paper, our concern is not with ethics but theories 
of meaning and interpretation: How can all divergent 
interpretations of a single expression be correct, and, 
indeed, endorsed by the speaker? As an exercise in cross-
cultural philosophical reflection, we will consider some of 
the leading modern theories of meaning—those of Grice, 
Quine, and Davidson—in order to see if the Upaniṣadic
story receives a natural home in any of them. The structure 
of our paper will be as follows. We will first narrate the 
story from the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (section 1). We 
will then discuss Paul Grice’s (1957) account of meaning, 
followed by Quine’s (1960), which challenges the former 
account. In this connection, we will also address Donald 
Davidson’s work, which, in turn, contrary to Quine, pleads 
for the possibility of “radical interpretation” (Davidson, 
1984) (section 2). Then, we will compare the views of Grice, 
Quine, and Davidson with the Upaniṣadic story to see 
whether the story can be analyzed in terms of any of their 
accounts (section 3). Finally, we conclude that the story is 
best understood through Grice’s theory of meaning rather 
than Quine’s or Davidson’s. 
1. THE UPANISHADIC STORY 
Prajāpati is one of the creator figures in the Vedic literature. 
The story in Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad is about Prajāpati and 
his three children—gods, human beings, and demons.2 
After completing their study under him as vedic students, 
it was time to say a respectful goodbye to their father. 
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Each posed a question to Prajāpati. Gods asked him, “The 
Venerable Lord, please instruct us.” Prajāpati replied by 
uttering the syllable, “Da,” and asked, “Have you understood 
me?” “Da” is not a word in any language, including Sanskrit 
(in which the story was written). Gods replied, “Yes Sir, we 
did. You told us to practice restraint (dāmyatā).” Prajāpati
replied, “Yes, you have understood me perfectly well.” 
The gods are said to be naturally self-indulgent and so 
Prajāpati instructs them to practice restraint.3 Then it was 
the turn of the humans. They asked, “The Venerable Lord, 
please instruct us.” Prajāpati replied by uttering the same 
syllable, “Da,” and asked, “Have you understood me?” 
Humans replied, “Yes, Sir, we have understood you. You 
asked us to practice charity (dattā).” Prajāpati replied, “Yes, 
you have understood me perfectly well.” Men are naturally 
avaricious and so they are instructed to distribute their 
wealth to the best of their ability.4 Demons repeated the 
same question to their spiritual father. Prajāpati replied to 
them by uttering the same syllable, “Da,” and asked, “Have 
you understood me?” Demons replied, “Yes, Sir, we have 
understood you. You asked us to practice compassion 
(dayadhvam).” Prajāpati replied, “Yes, you have understood 
me perfectly well.” Since the demons are by nature cruel 
and prone to inflict injury on others, they are instructed 
to be compassionate and kind to all.5 What we notice in 
this story is a general theme of how word-play and fanciful 
etymology is a larger part of Upaniṣadic literature. 
2. MEANING, TRANSLATION, AND RADICAL
INTERPRETATION IN ANALYTIC TRADITION 
The role of meaning in its different shades, along with 
other issues, dominated ordinary language philosophy, an 
influential movement in the middle of twentieth century. To 
develop his version of ordinary language philosophy, Grice 
begins by distinguishing what he calls “natural meanings” 
(as in “those spots mean measles”) from what he calls “non­
natural meaning” (as “Those three rings on the bell mean 
that the bus is full”). Since we are concerned with “non­
natural meaning,” we will begin with his definition of non-
natural meaning: “A meant something by x” is roughly the 
same as “A uttered x with the intention of inducing a belief 
by means of the recognition of this intention.”6 Here, “A” is a 
variable ranging over speakers and “x” is a variable ranging 
over utterances. For him, non-natural meanings expressed 
through sentences do not involve a contradiction when 
those sentences are denied (for example, “Those three 
rings on the bell mean that the bus is full, but the bus isn’t 
full” is not self-contradictory), whereas natural meanings 
expressed through sentences do (for example, “Those 
spots mean measles, but he hasn’t and got measles” is self-
contradictory). He contends that “speaker’s meaning” (what 
a speaker intends to communicate) is more fundamental 
than sentence meaning. Sentences mean what they do 
because of what speakers intend to communicate with the 
help of them rather than what speakers mean in some non-
intentional account of sentence meaning. 
One could, however, raise an objection that all interpretations 
or utterances in this category are just subjective and any 
interpretation is as good as any other. But, it would be 
much more radical for someone to deny fixed meanings of 
words in ordinary natural language when used in a perfectly 
ordinary and literal way. However, this is what Quine is 
trying to do. Quine sets out his argument by first assuming 
the possibility of a “radical translation” situation in which 
neither speaker knows a word of the other’s language. As 
idealized field linguists, we are interested in understanding 
what native speakers’ utterances mean. Suppose the native 
speakers utter, “gavagai.” We observe the speakers, hear 
what they utter and observe conditions under which they 
utter a word or sentence, watch what they are looking at 
or pointing out when they utter and the features of their 
surroundings when they make such utterances. Armed 
with such information, let’s assume we make a hypothesis 
that “gavagai” means “rabbit”. This hypothesis, according 
to Quine, is an analytic hypothesis because “gavagai,” 
according to that hypothesis, is, by definition, equivalent to 
“rabbit.” We do not know whether the hypothesis is correct 
given the evidence we have. 
Nonetheless, it does not deter us from further investigation. 
Like empirical scientists, we could explore whether 
the hypothesis about the native’s language is true and, 
consequently, ask the speakers themselves about it by 
recording their assent and dissent to and from it. Hoping 
to receive a confirmation from the speakers about the 
correctness of our hypothesis, we ask them, “Does ‘gavagai’ 
mean ‘rabbit’?” This will take us further away from any 
empirical evidence with which we have embarked on our 
journey on translation in the first-place. In the same way, 
another group of translators having the same evidence 
as we have might be tempted to translate “gavagai” as 
“undetached rabbit part” and would wish to adopt the same 
empirical procedure as ours to investigate whether their 
hypothesis about them is correct. Based on this thought 
experiment, Quine concludes that radical translation is not 
possible, as meaning is indeterminate. It is not possible 
to know whether the translation of “gavagai” as “rabbit” or 
“undetached rabbit part” is the correct analytic hypothesis.7 
Quine thinks that the “translation manual” which each 
translator puts together on the basis of (verbal) behavior in 
a particular (sensory) environment is under-determined by 
the totality of the behavioral/environmental evidence we 
are able to gather, i.e., each of us might be wrong about 
what the other “means” when he/she utters particular 
sounds. This is a corollary of, but is also intended to 
provide additional support for, Quine’s more sweeping 
thesis that all hypotheses/theories are under-determined 
by the evidence for them. 
Davidson, picking up on an argument of Quine’s, argued 
that the possibility of “different translation manuals” isn’t 
coherent; it presupposes the possibility that we could 
discover that the person whose language we are translating 
has a very different set of beliefs about the world (including 
beliefs concerning what there is) when in fact the only way 
in which we can make sense of what the other person is 
saying is to attribute to him/her many of our own beliefs. 
To say that another person has a different set of beliefs, 
hence, on every occasion, “means” something different 
from what we think he/she means, is (a) incapable of being 
confirmed by empirical evidence and (b) tantamount to 
admitting that we cannot make sense of his/her behavior. 
So we can “radically translate,” i.e., understand another in 
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a situation of “radical translation,” but only if we assume 
a “principle of charity,” i.e., attribute to the other person 
many of our own basic beliefs about the world and how 
they operate. 
The most important of these beliefs so far as “radical 
translation” is concerned involves “rationality.” To make 
sense of the other person’s behavior, we must begin to 
construe that person’s behavior as rational (in our meaning 
of the concept). This comes to saying that if they desire 
X and believe that doing Y will bring about X, then, other 
things being equal, they will do Y. For Davidson, speech 
is (for the most part, and in contrast to Quine) thoroughly 
intentional. Unless we can construe the other’s (verbal) 
behavior as intentional, i.e., “rational” (which just means 
that beliefs and desires fit together in the right way), we 
can’t begin to understand (interpret) it. 
In traditional vocabulary, rationality is an a priori (and hence 
normative) concept; it is presupposed by all successful 
communication. Davidson begins with what he takes to 
be an unquestionable fact—that we do (but not always) 
understand each other (in the base case, we understand 
ourselves when we speak, although, again, not always). He 
then asks what are the (a priori) conditions of successful 
communication? The general answer is “application of the 
Principle of Charity,” viz., attribution of many of our beliefs 
to the other person. The preliminary answer is “attribution 
of our concept of rationality to the other.” 
3. A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TRANSLATIONAL
ISSUES IN TWO TRADITIONS 
The conventions of a natural language establish relatively 
fixed meanings for words—the meanings one can find in a 
dictionary. But the interpretation of Prajāpati’s “da” is not 
governed by such conventions. The problem of interpreting 
Prajāpati’s “da” is that of interpreting a clue or hint as it 
is not actually an existing word in any existing language 
with a fixed, regular use. “Da” has meaning on each of the 
occasions on which it is used, but in response to different 
requests it is readily interpreted differently assuming a 
background of the discussion in the Vedic studies that 
have taken place. Metaphor provides another example of 
such meanings. For starters, Grice provides a better tool 
in analyzing the situation. Grice’s account of non-natural 
meaning, in which the speaker’s intention is given more 
importance than the sentence meaning, plays a pivotal role 
in understanding what Prajāpati says in each context to 
representatives of the three groups. One could even adopt 
Grice’s criterion to identify whether an expression conveys 
a non-natural meaning in the case of Prajāpati’s utterance 
of “da.” In one context, “da” means “practice restraint.” 
However, denying that it is the case (“da” means “practice 
restraint,” but they are not practicing restrain) does not 
entail flat-out contradiction. So, Grice’s theory of non-
natural meaning is readily adaptable to this case in which 
the speaker’s intention is the glue that connects each set 
of hearers to the speaker, Prajāpati. 
Consider Quine’s account. One plausible way to 
understand translations in the Upaniṣadic context and the 
indeterminacy thesis is to compare the gavagai example 
with the Upaniṣadic story. “Gavagai” means “rabbit” for a 
group of translators. It also means “undetached rabbit-part” 
for another group of translators, and there are infinite ways 
“gavagai” could be translated with infinitely many analytic 
hypotheses, at least according to Quine. In a similar vein, 
one could argue that “da” could be interpreted in infinitely 
many ways. Each group, with their distinctive background 
knowledge about themselves and Prajāpati, helps propose, 
in a Quinean sense, the analytic hypothesis about Prajāpati’s
intention. Like the gavagai example, it seems that there is 
no fact of the matter regarding the correct translation of 
“da” in the Upaniṣadic context.
However, there are seemingly far more differences 
between the Upaniṣadic story and Quine’s indeterminacy of 
translation than their alleged similarity. For Quine’s radical 
translation, the translator assumes nothing about the 
speaker’s language and utterances except her assent and 
dissent. In contrast, in the Upaniṣadic example, Prajāpati, 
gods, humans, and demons belong to the same linguistic 
community. In the case of Quine, the translator posits her 
analytic hypothesis about the meaning of the speaker’s 
utterances and intends to examine whether her hypothesis 
is correct by asking the speaker whether her translation 
is correct. As we already know by now, this investigation 
further exacerbates complexities for radical translation. Our 
way of contrasting the Quine’s account with the Upaniṣadic
story, however, tells a different tale. When gods, human 
beings, or demons ask Prajāpati whether “da” means “x,” 
depending on who the speakers are, Prajāpati replies, 
“Yes, you have understood what ‘da’ meant.” However, 
the complication that Prajāpati’s seemingly unequivocal 
responses generate is that we don’t know whether he 
really meant anything or nothing, or all of them together, 
for the meaning of “da.” 
In Davidson’s radical translation, like Quine’s, speakers 
and hearers do not speak the same language, and the 
hearers are interested in translating what the speakers say 
in a specific situation under specific conditions. There is 
no such Davidsonian radical translation occurring in the 
Upaniṣadic story as there is no problem of understanding 
each other’s language via the principle of charity. All four in 
the story speak the same language. This, however, might 
not close the door of seeking a connection between the 
story and Davidson’s account. One might contend that even 
within particular linguistic communities, we must employ 
the principle of charity. On this basis, if we continue to 
apply Davidson's framework onto the Upaniṣadic world, 
then we need to consider whether the conditions under 
which the speakers utter “da” are the same conditions 
under which, for example, the hearer replies “dayadhvam,” 
and whether the converse is also the case. Here, for the 
sake of discussion, we assume that “da” is a one-word 
sentence and so is its “semantic correlate” “dayadhvam.” 
In one sense, truth-conditions for both sentences are the 
same. The same is also true for the rest for the translations 
of “da” into two other one-worded sentences. Although 
all four—Prajāpati, gods, human beings, and demons— 
belong to the same linguistic community, the principle 
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of charity need not be trivially true since even within the 
same linguistic community we do misunderstand each 
other from time to time. But the possibility of identifying 
such misunderstanding rests on our assumption that we 
understand each other the majority of the time. It is indeed 
correct that, in the story, each translation is different from 
the other. For example, “da” is interpreted as “practice 
restraint” and also as “practice generosity.” But we can 
disambiguate the response (which is the crux of Davidson’s 
concern) in each case by noting that it is directed to gods, 
humans, and demons, whose respective modes of behavior 
require different correctives. One needs to remind oneself 
that the issue is not whether the three groups along with 
Prajāpati belong to the same linguistic community. This is 
why the Upaniṣadic story does not fit in the Davidsonian 
framework. The single most important issue to remember 
is that unlike “gavagai,” “da” is not even a word in any 
language. 
So far, we have investigated whether western theories 
of meaning can shed light on these iconic Upaniṣadic
passages. Our findings are five-fold: First, like Grice’s 
account of non-linguistic meaning, Prajāpati’s story about 
“da” exploits the idea of the speaker’s meaning where the 
intention of the speaker plays the most significant role. 
Hence, Grice’s theory is readily adaptable to the Upaniṣadic
story. Second, unlike the Upaniṣadic story, the conventions 
of natural language presuppose relatively fixed meanings 
with which both Quine and Davidson are operating, although 
Quine contests whether we could ever read the speaker’s 
intention correctly. Third, unlike Quine, the Upaniṣadic
story presupposes speakers and hearers as belonging to 
the same linguistic community. However, the problem of 
a comparison between Quine and the story lies in the fact 
that “da” is not a word in any language. Fourth, contrary 
to Quine, in the case of this story, there is a way to check 
whether the hearers have in fact understood Prajāpati. A 
pertinent question could be, “How does Prajāpati know that 
his students have understood him”? The only way to know 
this is to see whether they answer what he wants them to 
say. This is not necessarily the only way to know whether 
his students answer the question correctly because it 
might require some reflection on our part to realize that 
the students have in fact provided a correct response to 
the question. For example, if we say, “Name one famous 
author who was born in Missouri,” some might reply, 
“Maya Angelou.” We might realize that this is a correct 
response only after some reflection because we might 
have mistakenly thought that Mark Twain was the only 
correct answer. For Davidson, “understanding the other” is 
always problematic, even when “the other” is the speaker 
herself. We have to interpret even our own utterances to 
make sense of them. In this respect, it is possible to map 
the Upaniṣadic story to the context of radical interpretation. 
Fifth, based on this consideration, if we are motivated to 
endorse Davidsonian radical interpretation to be at work in 
the Upaniṣadic story, because the truth-conditions for the 
one-word sentence “Da” are the same as the two-worded 
sentence “practice charity,” then we would be forced to 
endorse radical interpretation relativized to a specific 
linguistic community, where “da” is disambiguated in 
different ways by their characteristic modes of behavior. 
So, if we think that Davidson’s account might be of help 
in unlocking the issues regarding the possibility of radical 
translation in the Upaniṣadic story, then we would be 
tempted to overlook the other significant difference 
between the two. Davidson assumes a convention in natural 
language where words have relatively fixed meanings— 
meanings one could find in a dictionary. However, in the 
Upaniṣadic story, “da” is not a word in any existing language 
because of which we have to abandon the assumption 
that words in natural languages have fixed meanings. In 
this respect, as we have already argued, Grice’s theory 
of non-natural meaning is a better tool to understand the 
Upaniṣadic story. 
CONCLUSION 
Our cross-cultural exploration into the philosophical 
works of Western and Eastern traditions by analyzing 
whether well-known Western theories of meaning could 
shed light on the Upaniṣadic story have revealed that 
they help understand each other. Our findings are not 
always straightforward as the story and theories used to 
interpret the story involve different shades of complexity.
We discussed the Upaniṣadic story about “da,” and how 
that word has been translated differently by the three sets 
of children of Prajāpati. We also discussed Grice, Quine, 
and Davidson’s take on translation by drawing an analogy 
between the gavagai example and the story in question. 
We pointed out that there are prospects and problems 
for this sort of comparative study. Grice’s theory of non-
natural meaning was seen to be the most useful account 
when trying to situate the Upaniṣadic story in the tradition 
of analytic philosophy. We argued further that if we care to 
find a resemblance between the gavagai example and the 
Upaniṣadic story, then we need to be circumspect about the 
convention that word meanings of a language are relatively 
fixed. This convention is either assumed or contested 
depending on whether we deal with Davidson or Quine, 
respectively. If we grant that the Upaniṣadic story reads 
more like a parable, Quine would be unsure whether we 
have got the meaning of the parable right. It is possible, for 
all we know, that we have mistaken it. Davidson, however, 
begins with the assumption that we have it right and then 
looks for the conditions that must obtain for this to be 
possible. Davidson concedes that this assumption is often 
(but not too often) mistaken, but then our identifying a 
mistake depends on successfully translating the rest of the 
parable (e.g., we have to assume that “gods,” “humans,” 
and “demons” mean the same thing as the Upaniṣadic story 
that they do for us who hear/read them). If they don’t, the 
word “da” could not be disambiguated in the way that we 
do, and the whole point of the parable would consequently 
be lost. 
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NOTES 
1.	 See Eliot and North, The Waste Land: Authoritative Text, Context, 
Criticism, for the critical edition of The Waste Land. 
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2. Some translations of the Upanisadic passages are due to us. 
3. Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upanishads, 289–91. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid. 
6. H. P. Grice, “Meaning,” 384. 
7. Hacking, Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?, 146. 
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Philosophy and Anticolonialism 
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The theme of “Indian Philosophy and Culture” begs an 
important question: What is the relationship between 
“philosophy” and “culture,” anyway? One stock answer 
would deny connection: culture is located in historical and 
geographical particulars; philosophy is what pushes past 
those particulars toward timeless, universal truths. 
Whether or not anybody would actually endorse an 
unqualified version of that claim, I don’t know. But there is a 
way in which the very phrase “Indian Philosophy” rhetorically 
presumes it: by identifying its referent as specifically 
“Indian,” it argues for Indian philosophy’s inclusion in the 
philosophical canon, while also simultaneously marking 
it as different from philosophy per se. Indian philosophy, 
it suggests, is shaped by Indian culture to an extent that 
U.S. or British philosophy is not. The rhetorical move at play 
here will be very familiar to readers of postcolonial theory: 
by preserving a marker of national difference, the category 
“Indian philosophy” enacts an argument for India’s parity 
with metropolitan structures of academic production 
while also and at the same time reinforcing the barriers 
separating India from full inclusion in those structures. 
To make itself visible, Indian philosophy has to flag its 
Indian-ness, thus allowing it only qualified inclusion in the 
ostensibly universal realm of pure thought. 
I am not competent to comment on how such markers 
of national difference function in academic philosophy 
departments. Instead, as a scholar with interests in 
postcolonial theory, cultural studies, and the history of 
religion in modern India, I want to dwell on an adjacent 
question. In what ways has the category “philosophy” 
played a role in marking Indian cultural specificity since 
the late nineteenth century? In this short essay, I consider 
this question in general terms by outlining the history of 
Orientalist and anticolonial uses of Indian philosophy 
during the long nineteenth century. As cultural critic Ashis 
Nandy pointed out many years ago, M. K. Gandhi’s public 
image was a carefully cultivated appropriation of colonial 
stereotypes about the “mystic” Indian. In laying claim to 
the ideologically laden trope of the “spiritual East,” Gandhi 
also inverted and challenged this trope.1 My aim here is 
to elaborate on this now-classic argument by considering 
related nineteenth- and twentieth-century figures. I am 
particularly interested in how the apparent “religiosity” of 
Indian thought served to trouble its status as “philosophy.” 
ANTICOLONIAL METAPHYSICS 
By the turn of the twentieth century, philosophy had 
(however surprisingly) become a principal idiom of 
nationalist politics. Indian revolutionaries tried to revive 
key ideas from the six classical systems of thought 
schematized by Sanskritic tradition. They also read widely 
in contemporary Western philosophy, reinterpreting these 
texts for their own ends. Whether in Lala Har Dayal’s 
adaptation of Spencer, Brajendranath Seal’s invocations of 
Hegel, or Muhammad Iqbal’s turns Bergson, what literary 
critic Leela Gandhi has dubbed “anticolonial metaphysics” 
was the order of the day.2 
To understand why this was the case, we need to step 
back in time to an earlier moment in the history of British 
colonialism in the subcontinent. In the early nineteenth 
century, there were two competing schools of thought 
about how the British should rule its colony. On the one 
hand were Orientalists like William Jones, who celebrated 
classical Indian languages and cultures and advocated for 
their importance to world history. On the other were the 
Anglicizers, who (in the now-infamous words of Thomas 
Macaulay) thought that “a single shelf of a good European 
library was worth the whole native literature of India and 
Arabia.”3 
If English education is what ultimately allowed Indian elites 
ready access to Western philosophy, it was Orientalism 
that made philosophy pertinent to empire. Orientalist art 
had long abstracted “the East” from history to render it 
the seemingly timeless object of Western contemplation. 
This was especially true of the trope of “mystic India.” The 
subcontinent, it was said, was philosophical to a fault, its 
denizens lost in a mist of airily metaphysical speculation 
about the fundamental unreality of the phenomenal world.4 
It was perhaps fitting, then, that this Orientalist stereotype 
should endear India to the Germans—it being, in Marx’s 
formulation, precisely Germany’s historical backwardness 
that made it philosophically great (“We are the philosophical 
contemporaries of the present day without being its 
historical contemporaries,” he wrote).5 German Romantics 
were early and avid advocates for Sanskrit literature. 
Goethe praised Kalidasa’s Shakuntala and the Ring of 
Recollection in the highest terms, and at least one tortured 
young poetess decided to end her life in a way that she 
understood to be modeled on the figure of the “suttee.”6 
The Germans’ enthusiasm eventually spread to other 
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